

A System for Graph-Based Visualization of the Evolution of Software

A (Short) Exercise in Reproduction

Christian Collberg
Stephen Kobourov
Jasvir Nagra
Jacob Pitts
Kevin Wampler
Todd Proebsting
Keith Alcock

SOFTVIS 2003

—
VISSOFT 2019

Department of Computer Science
University of Arizona

<http://repeatability.cs.arizona.edu>
<http://findresearch.org>

<http://graphael.cs.arizona.edu>
<http://sandmark.cs.arizona.edu>

A System for Graph-Based Visualization of the Evolution of Software

Christian Collberg^{1*}



Stephen Kobourov^{1†}



Jasvir Nagra^{2‡}



Jacob Pitts¹



Kevin Wampler^{1†}



Abstract

We describe GEVOL, a system that visualizes the evolution of software using a novel graph drawing technique for visualization of large graphs with temporal component. GEVOL extracts information about a Java program stored within a CVS version control system and displays it using a temporal graph visualizer. This information can be used by programmers to understand the evolution of a legacy program: Why is the program structured the way it is? Which programmers were responsible for which parts of the program during which time periods? Which parts of the program appear unstable over long periods of time and may need to be rewritten? This type of information will complement that produced by more static tools such as source code browsers, slicers, and static analyzers.

- Bob is asked to port P to a new operating system or architecture.

In many cases Bob will find that the program is undocumented, unstructured, and poorly written. Worse, the original developers may not be available to explain how the system works. Before he can start modifying the program he therefore needs to build a mental model of its structure. To aid in this discovery process he can run the program, examine the source code, and read any available documentation. Various tools such as source code browsers and static analyzers may be helpful in this respect.

In this paper we will describe a new tool — GEVOL — that aid in the discovery of the structure of legacy systems. GEVOL discovers the *evolution* of a program by visualizing the changes the system has gone through. In particular, GEVOL extracts information about Java programs that are stored within a CVS version control system. It then extracts

tgrip

The screenshot shows the SandMark GUI with a central graph visualization area displaying a complex network of red nodes and edges. The graph is surrounded by a list of class names including `sandmark.util.exec.TracingException`, `java.lang.Exception`, `sandmark.gui.ObfTree`, `javax.swing.Scrollable`, `sandmark.util.stacksimulator.Int`, and `sandmark.obfuscate.varsplitter.VarSplitter`. On the left side, there are control panels for 'GRAPH FORMAT' (Internally Generated, GML File), 'DISPLAY OPTIONS' (Interactive Display, Read GML Graphics, Background Color, Foreground Color, Display Speed, Dimension), 'GRAPH OPTIONS' (File Name, Split Components), and 'ALGORITHM' (GRIP, Fruchterman-Reingold). At the bottom, there are settings for 'Filtration Technique' (MIS), 'Number of Initial Vertices' (4), 'Refinement Algorithm' (Localize), 'Number of Refinement Levels' (1), 'Number of Initial Rounds' (20), and 'Number of Final Rounds' (20). Buttons for 'Run', 'Reset', 'Help', and 'Quit' are also visible.

The screenshot shows the 'View JarFile' window with a 'Class Sort' and 'Method Sort' list on the left, including methods like `hit()`, `clear()`, `<init>()`, `start()`, `free()`, `move()`, `init()`, `singleHit()`, `mark()`, and `main()`. The main area displays a control flow graph (CFG) with nodes representing code blocks. The nodes contain instructions such as `if_acmpne`, `if_icmplt`, `aload`, `bipush`, `goto`, and `invokevirtual`. The CFG shows a flow from 'block 0 source' through various blocks (2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) to 'block 13'. A 'NODE INFORMATION' panel is visible at the bottom of the CFG view.

SandMark





①







1



2





- control flow graphs
- inheritance graphs
- call graphs




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


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
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
author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle



author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle


author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle



author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle


color progression



author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

color progression




author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

color progression

Bob broke the build!



author 1 is red 


author 2 is yellow 

color progression


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
Bob broke the build!



Bob broke the build!



Bob broke the build!



author 1 is red ■


author 2 is yellow ■

color progression


■, ■, ■, ■, ■

■, ■, ■, ■, ■

Bob broke the build!



Bob broke the build!




author 1 is red  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle


author 2 is yellow  \langle  ,  ,  ,  ,  \rangle

color progression

Bob broke the build!



Bob broke the build!





author 1 is red ■ ⟨ ■, ■, ■, ■, ■ ⟩


author 2 is yellow ■ ⟨ ■, ■, ■, ■, ■ ⟩

color progression

Bob broke the build!



author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression


    


    

**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!



author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression


    


    

**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!



author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression


    


    

**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!



author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression



    

**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!




**10k LOC
removed!**

author 1 is red 
author 2 is yellow 


color progression
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >


**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!



**10k LOC
removed!**

author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression


    


**Bob broke
the build!**

Again!



**10k LOC
removed!**


author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 

color progression






author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 

color progression
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >


**Author 1
is a
programmer**





author 1 is red 
author 2 is yellow 

color progression
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >
<  ,  ,  ,  ,  >

**Author 2
is an
architect**




author 1 is red 

author 2 is yellow 


color progression





gui





transformations


june 2002
—
**mediation
point
introduced**











OMG

—

**Bob broke
the build
again!!!**

CVSscan: commit_prep.pl

File Settings

Display Engines Blocks

Presets

Version drawing

Lines

Fit to window

Fit to line

Reshuffle ID colors

Version size

10.14

Line size

2.19

Vertical scroll speed

3

Zoom controls

Revision blending

0.6

Block blending

0.3

Font height

17

Font width

9

Font difference

1

Left interval selector

Evolution overview

Right interval selector

Version centric filter

1

2

Code view, main layer

Code view, second layer

3

```

$pos = index($line, "\\FreeBSD");
last if ($pos >= 0);
}


if ($pos == -1) {
printf($NoId, $filename);
return(1);
}

$bareid = (index($line, "\\FreeBSD: \\$") >= 0)


}
$ind = index($path, $line);
}
close(EX);
}
if ($pos == -1) {
printf($NoId, $filename);
return(1);
}
$bareid = (index($line, "TRADER
index($line, "\\$HEADE" >= 0)

```


CVSscan: Visualization of Code Evolution



Code Flows: Visualizing Structural Evolution of Source Code




Visual Exploration of Large-Scale System Evolution



(a) June 2003–August 2003

(b) August 2003–August 2004



(c) August 2004–August 2005

(d) August 2005–August 2006

Visualizing Co-Change Information with the Evolution Radar

So, What
Happened
Next?

Visualizing Software Evolution



Christian Collberg, Stephen Kobourov, Jasvir Nagra

Jacob Pitts and Kevin Wampler

Jasvir Nagra


jas@cs.auckland.ac.nz

University of Auckland
New Zealand



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp



Visualizing Software Evolution

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Jasvir Nagra

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

University of Auckland
New Zealand

Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp




Visualizing Software Evolution

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Jacob Pitts and Kevin Wampler

Jasvir Nagra

jas@cs.auckland.ac.nz



My "friend"
Todd


Me

Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp





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My "friend"
Todd


Me

Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp





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Todd


Me

Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp





Visualizing Software Evolution

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Jasvir Nagra

jas@cs.auckland.ac.nz



My "friend"
Todd



Me




Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp





Visualizing Software Evolution

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Jasvir Nagra

jas@cs.auckland.ac.nz



My "friend"
Todd


Me

Jasvir



Inheritance

Nodes colored by recent author and timestamp






Visualizing Software Evolution

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Jacob Pitts and Kevin Wampler

Jasvir Nagra
jas@cs.auckland.ac.nz

University of Auckland
New Zealand





The New Zealand Herald

You're not in Guatemala now... A5



LONELY PLANET'S LATEST VERDICT ON NEW ZEALAND

TimeOut LIFTOUT
Best TV, movies, music

BRANDON ROUTH, SUPERMAN AND SPECIAL AGENT

Why the housing market is GOOD NEWS B2

PLUS Aucklanders YOUR CITY, YOUR NEWS



TOASTMASTERS INTERNATIONAL®

WHERE LEADERS ARE MADE

...and five points.
Earlier, he told the Herald he had "lost all" confidence in Mr Garrett and didn't believe he should stand down as an MP.
"I think the fact that he has made mistakes in his past makes him more credible."
Mr Hyde retained his leadership of the party with the support of Mr Garrett's new deputy leader John Snowdon after a series of internal battles, including a messy clash with his former deputy leader, Heather Roy.
In a prepared statement to Parliament yesterday, Mr Garrett said that 26 years ago he had used a method he had read about in the spy thriller *The Day After Tomorrow* to steal the identity of a dead baby and obtain a passport — an offense which can draw a maximum penalty of five years' jail or a fine of \$5,000.
Mr Garrett said that at the time of the offense, he "mistakenly" saw it as a "heroic gesture", and he never used the passport. After it expired, he destroyed it.
That 25 years later, in 2005, he was arrested when police conducted a sweep of illicit passports after Israeli secret service agents

LOIS O'JANNES, BUT STILL NOT OUT
The political life and times of **DAVID GARRETT**

NOVEMBER 2008
Compares homosexuality to paedophilia during the filming of a TVNZ current affairs discussion. Some of those present later allege Act's new MP was drunk.

JUNE 2009
Spoken to by Act leader Rodney Hyde after making sexual comments to a female member of the party's parliamentary office. Garrett says he is on a steep learning curve and that "the kind of thing that might have been okay in a law firm in Tonga is not okay in




MAY 9, 2010
Suggests parents with a history of child abuse should be given a \$5000 incentive to be sterilised.


SEPTEMBER 2010
Confirms he has a previously undisclosed assault conviction dating back to 2002 when he was working as a lawyer in Tonga; tells Parliament how


Jacks' as inspiration to obtain a fraudulent passport and how he was later prosecuted for identity theft

...the process and how someone people who supported Mr Brown, could result in a Brown victory.
The survey found support for the minor contenders has fallen to below the margin of error since last month's poll.
North Shore Mayor Andrew Williams has dropped from 50 per cent to 1, and business man Colin Craig is down from 25 to 15.
Last night, Mr Brown said he had been ahead in all the polls this year, but that was irrelevant as postal voting was about to start.
"I'm out there doing everything I can to connect with the community and give them a positive vision for Auckland's future," he said.
Mr Banks said Aucklanders had to consider who was the best leader to make the tough decisions when they were needed most — and vote.
"It's a very hard-fought battle for the hearts and minds. On election day, it will be very close," he said.
One poll question found Mr Banks would be the best national candidate in a crisis like












*Semi
Finals*



But, can it be
Replicated?

SandMark

tgrip




1


2


3

sandmark.cs.arizona.edu

Version	Release date	Files	Supporting Software
V3.4	August 11, 2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• sandmark.jar• sandmark-src.zip• README	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• BCEL.jar (from http://jakarta.apache.org/bcel/)• bloat-1.0.jar (from http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/hosking/bloat/)• dynamicjava.jar (from http://koala.ilog.fr/djava/)• junit.jar (from http://www.junit.org/)
		<p>The development of SandMark is supported by the AFRL under contract F33615-02-C-1146, and by the New Economy Research Fund of New Zealand under contracts UOAX9906 and UOAX0214.</p> <p>SandMark 3.4.0 (Mystic) runs on Windows, Linux, and MacOS and requires Java 1.4.</p> <p>SandMark 3.4.0 includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• 13 static analysis algorithms• 33 code generation algorithms• 3 control flow graph algorithms• 6 basic block algorithms• a variety of other algorithms• 6 algorithms for detecting software watermarks• a variety of other algorithms <p>control flow graphs, register interference graphs, and method slices, to protect a program.</p>	
V3.3	October 22, 2002	V3.1.1 (October 22, 2002)	required to build)
		<p>Supporting Software</p> <p>This release includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• bug fixes• a simple API• an optimized control flow graph algorithm• an improved control flow graph algorithm• an implementation of the Venkatesan et al. watermarking algorithm (US Patent 5,559,884), which is resistant to software watermarks),• the ability to generate control flow graphs• a variety of other algorithms• a static analysis algorithm <p>crypt watermarking algorithm (US Patent 5,745,569).</p> <p>Watermarking algorithm of Venkatesan et al. (US Patent 5,559,884).</p> <p>Watermarking algorithm.</p> <p>can be executed like this:</p> <pre>java -jar sandmark.jar</pre>	
V3.2	January 28, 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• sandmark.jar• sandmark-src.zip• README• API• Developer's Guide• User's Guide• Algorithms	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• BCEL.jar (from jakarta.apache.org/bcel)• bloat-1.0.jar (from http://www.cs.purdue.edu/homes/hosking/bloat/)• Java 1.4• Tic-Tac-Toe (our standard testcase)(source)







SandMark 3.1.1

File Edit Help

Recognize Confuse

Log of execution

Welcome to Sandmark!

Recognize

Confuse

TRA...

jar f...

Classp...

Ma...

Argume...

Trace f...

Browse

Default

Default

⌘1

Default

⌘2

Default

⌘3

Default

⌘4

Default

⌘5

```
> java -cp sandmark.jar:BCEL.jar:bloat-1.0.jar sandmark.Console
Welcome to Sandmark!
```


View JarFile

Class Sort Method Sort

hello

- HelloWorld
 - <init> ()V
 - main([Ljava/lang/String;)V

Instructions CFG Interference Graph Statistics

```
graph TD; B0["block 0 source"] --> B2["block 2  
0: getstatic[178](3) 2"]; B2 --> B3["block 3  
3: ldc[18](2) 3"]; B3 --> B4["block 4"]; style B4 width:0px,height:0px
```

Metrics Harrison Measure

Opcodes nop

Graph zoom

NODE INFORMATION

This is very slow and may use up your RAM

View JarFile

Method Sort

Instructions CFG Interference Graph Statistics

hello
Hello world
main()V
main/java/lang/String

block 0 source

block 2
0: getstatic[178](3) 2

block 3
1: ldc[18](2)

block 4

Metrics Harrison Measure

Opcodes nop


Graph zoom

NODE INFORMATION


This is very slow and may use up your RAM

```
graph TD; B0["block 0 source"] --> B2["block 2  
0: getstatic[178](3) 2"]; B2 --> B3["block 3  
1: ldc[18](2)"]; B3 --> B4["block 4"]; B4 --> B0;
```



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


tgrip.cs.arizona.edu




graphael.cs.arizona.edu





Our current test case is the SandMark system which consists of approximately 90,000 lines of code developed over 200 days.



Paper submission:
Dec. 16, 2002

Our current test case is the SandMark system which consists of approximately 90,000 lines of code developed over 200 days.

```
Default ⌘2  
> cd /Users/collberg/wmark/smark3  
> cvs log | & gawk '/date: 2002/{print $2}' | sort -u | wc -w  
244
```




Paper submission:
Dec. 16, 2002

Our current test case is the SandMark system, which consists of approximately 90,000 lines of code developed over a day.



```
Default \#2  
> cd /Users/collberg/wmark/smark3  
> cvs log | & gawk '/date: 2002/{print $2}' | sort -u  
244
```





1



2



3






1

version 6

2



3





1



3

2



Run

Reset

Help

Quit

GRAPH FORMAT

- Internally Generated
- GML File

DISPLAY OPTIONS

- Interactive Display On
- Read GML Graphics On
- Background Color:
- Foreground Color:
- Display Speed:
- Dimension:

GRAPH OPTIONS

- File Name:
- Split Components On

ALGORITHM

- GRIP
- Fruchterman-Reingold

Filtration Technique MIS

Number of Initial Vertices:

Refinement Algorithm Localize

Number of Refinement Levels:

Number of Initial Rounds:

Number of Final Rounds:

.main





1




version 6

2



3







1




2



3

4

How were experiments carried out?






1




3


4

How were experiments carried out?



The system allows the user to specify (using a regular expression) the range of values for a particular field of a node that the user wishes to view.





View_JarFile

Class Sort Method Sort

Instructions CFG Interference Graph Statistics Metrics Slicing

Metrics McCabe Method Measure

Opcodes nop

Graph zoom

NODE INFORMATION

Run

Reset

Help

Quit

GRAPH FORMAT

- Internally Generated
- GML File

DISPLAY OPTIONS

Interactive Display On

Read GML Graphics On

Background Color White

Foreground Color Black

Display Speed 0

Dimension 3

GRAPH OPTIONS

File Name merge5.gml

Split Components On

ALGORITHM

- GRIP
- Fruchterman-Reingold

Filtration Technique MIS

Number of Initial Vertices 4

Refinement Algorithm Localize

Number of Refinement Levels 1

Number of Initial Rounds 20

Number of Final Rounds 20

./main

sandmark.util.exec.TracingException

sandmark.util.graph.codec.DecodeFailure

sandmark.watermark.WatermarkingException

sandmark.obfuscate.ObfuscationException

java.lang.Exception

sandmark.gui.ObfTree

javax.swing.Scrollable

sandmark.gui.SkinPanel

sandmark.gui.MultiHeaded

java.awt.ItemSelectable

sandmark.gui.VSortPanel

sandmark.watermark.ct.encode

sandmark.watermark.ct.encode

sandmark.watermark.ct.encode

sandmark.obfuscate.degradation.promotion.DPromote

sandmark.util.stacksimulator



sandmark.util.stacksimulator.Int

sandmark.util.stacksimulator.Co


sandmark.obfuscate.varsplitter.VarSplitter




Method Interference



Control Flow



Why Should We
Care?



Some Computer Security Paper

Well-known Authors

Abstract

We present a new general technique for protecting clients in distributed systems against *Remote Man-at-the-end* (R-MATE) attacks. Such attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to an untrusted client device and can obtain an advantage from tampering with the hardware itself or the software it contains.

In our system, the trusted server overweighs the untrusted client's analytical abilities by continuously and automatically generating and pushing to him diverse client code variants. The diversity subsystem employs a set of primitive code transformations that provide an ever-changing attack target for the adversary, making tampering difficult without this being detected by the server.

1. Introduction

Man-at-the-end (MATE) attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to a device and compromises it by tampering with its hardware or software. *Remote man-at-the-end* (R-MATE) attacks occur in distributed systems where *untrusted clients* are in frequent communication with *trusted servers* over a network, and malicious user can get an advantage by compromising an untrusted device.


To illustrate the ubiquity of R-MATE vulnerabilities, consider the following four scenarios. First, in the *Advanced Metering Infrastructure* (AMI) for controlling the electrical power grid, networked devices ("smart meters") are installed at individual households to allow two-way communication with control servers of the utility company. In an R-MATE attack against the AMI, a malicious consumer tampers with the meter to emulate an imminent blackout, or to trick a control server to send disconnect commands to other customers [7,21]. Second, massive multiplayer online games are susceptible to R-MATE attacks since a malicious player who tampers with the game client can get an advantage over other players [16]. Third, wireless sensors are often deployed in unsecured environments (such as theaters of war) where they are vulnerable to tampering attempts. A compromised sensor could be coerced into supplying the wrong observations to a base station, causing real-world damage. Finally, while electronic health records (EHR) are typically protected by encryption while stored in databases and in transit to doctors' offices, they are vulnerable to R-MATE attack if an individual doctor's client machine is compromised.

1.1 Overview


In each of the scenarios above the adversary's goal is to tamper with the client code and data under his control. The trusted server's goal is to *detect* any such integrity violations, after which countermeasures (such as severing connections, legal remedies, etc.) can be launched.

Security mechanisms. In this paper we present a system that achieves protection against R-MATE attacks through the extensive use of code diversity and continuous code replacement. In our system, the trusted server continuously and automatically generates diverse variants of client code, pushes these code updates to the untrusted clients, and installs them as the client is running. The intention is to force the client to constantly analyze and re-analyze incoming code variants, thereby overwhelming his analytical abilities, and making it difficult for him to tamper with the continuously changing code without this being detected by the trusted server.

Limitations. Our system specifically targets distributed applications which have frequent client-server communication, since client tampering can only be detected at client-server interaction events. Furthermore, while our use of code diversity can *delay* an attack, it cannot completely *prevent* it. Our goal is therefore the rapid *detection* of attacks; applications which need to completely prevent any tampering of client code, for even the shortest lengths of time, are not suitable targets for our system. To see this, consider the following timeline in the history of a distributed application running under our system:



The e_i 's are *interaction events*, points in time when clients communicate with servers either to exchange application data or to perform code updates. At time t_1 the client tampers with the code under his control. Until the next interaction event, during interval I_1 , the client runs autonomously, and the server cannot detect the attack. At time t_2 , after an interval I_2 consisting of a few interaction events, the client's tampering has caused it to display anomalous behavior, perhaps through the use of an outdated communication protocol, and the server detects this. At time t_3 , finally, the server issues a response, perhaps by shutting



Some Computer Security Paper

Abstract

We present a system above the adversary's goal is to protect any such information under his control. The system provides protection against R-MATE attacks such as several mechanisms. In this paper, we describe the system through the client's analytical abilities by continuously generating and pushing to him diverse client diversity subsystem employs a set of primitive mechanisms that provide an ever-changing attack to the adversary, making tampering difficult without this by the server.

1. Introduction

Man-at-the-end (MATE) attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to a device and tampering with its hardware or software. *Man-at-the-end* (R-MATE) attacks occur in distributed systems where *untrusted clients* are in frequent communication with *trusted servers* over a network, and malicious users can tamper with the servers by compromising an untrusted device.

To illustrate the ubiquity of R-MATE attacks, we consider the following four scenarios:

- Smart Grid Infrastructure* (AMI) for controlling smart grid, networked devices ("smart meters") in individual households to allow two-way communication with control servers of the utility company.
- Smart Meters*: In an R-MATE attack against the AMI, a malicious consumer tampers with the meter to emulate an imminent blackout, or to trick a control server to send disconnect commands to other customers [7,21].
- Second, massive multiplayer online games* are susceptible to R-MATE attacks since a malicious player who tampers with the game client can get an advantage over other players [16].
- Third, wireless sensors* are often deployed in unsecured environments (such as theaters of war) where they are vulnerable to tampering attempts. A compromised sensor could be coerced into supplying the wrong observations to a base station, causing real-world damage.
- Finally, while electronic health records (EHR)* are typically protected by encryption while stored in databases and in transit to doctors' offices, they are vulnerable to R-MATE attack if an individual doctor's client machine is compromised.

Authors






The e_i 's are *interaction events*, points in time when clients communicate with servers either to exchange application data or to perform code updates. At time t_1 the client tampers with the code under his control. Until the next interaction event, during interval I_1 , the client runs autonomously, and the server cannot detect the attack. At time t_2 , after an interval I_2 consisting of a few interaction events, the client's tampering has caused it to display anomalous behavior, perhaps through the use of an outdated communication protocol, and the server detects this. At time t_3 , finally, the server issues a response, perhaps by shutting

To: authors@cs.ux.edu

Cool paper! Can you send me your system so I can break it? 😊

Thanks!

Christian




To: authors@cs.ux.edu

Cool paper! Can you send me your system so I can break it? 😊

Thanks!

Christian



REIMPLEMENT!

```
reimplement.hs
type Operator =
  | A
  | B of operand -> value -> opino
  | C of operand * value -> operand * value
  | D of operand * value * operand * opino
  | E of operand * operand
```

U:--- reimplement.hs All L1 (Lisp Interaction)




Technical
Report


PhD
Thesis

Conference
Paper

To: authors@cs.ux.edu
f: never used!
g: not defined!
h: doesn't type check!
i: different in TR and paper!





I ... have **few recollections of the work**. [It was] like seeing a new paper for the first time.




To: PI,DC@cs.ux.edu

**Request under the OPEN
RECORDS ACT ... ALL RESEARCH
ARTIFACTS ...**




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
... to the extent such records may exist, **they will not be produced pursuant to ORA.**




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... and no, they don't exist...








GitHub




Bitbucket




TortoiseSVN



Pursuant to ORA, I request
copies of **all electronic mail...**



... a total cost of **\$2,263.66** to search for, retrieve, redact and produce such records.






Grant application

#: [REDACTED]

We will also make our data and software available to the research community **when appropriate.**



Consequences

By

- not sharing their artifacts,
- (perhaps unintentionally) leaving holes in their publications, and
- not responding to questions,

the authors have effectively guaranteed that their claims can never be refuted.



Consequences

By

- not sharing their artifacts,
- (perhaps unintentionally) leaving holes in their publications, and
- not responding to questions,

the authors have effectively guaranteed that their claims can never be refuted.

A rolled-up scroll with red caps and a piece of parchment with text. The scroll is positioned at the top of the image, and the parchment is unrolled below it. The text is written in a bold, black, sans-serif font.

8th Law of Artifact Sharing (Pretschner's Law)

The probability of getting code out of someone is inversely proportional to the outrageousness of the claims in the paper.

The Deception Study

601 Research Papers





601 Research Papers




Has code?





- 1. Article?
- 2. Web?
- 3. Email?






- 1. Article?
- 2. Web?
- 3. Email?



- 1. ≤ 30 mins?
- 2. > 30 mins?
- 3. Author?



601 Research Papers

Has code?

Can we find it?

Does it "work"?


1. Article?
2. Web?
3. Email?


1. ≤ 30 mins?
2. > 30 mins?
3. Author?


Weakly Repeatable


Authors share their code, and it builds.











The good news ... I was able to find some code. I am just **hoping** that it ... **matches the implementation** we ... used for the paper.



Versioning

Unfortunately the **current system is not mature** ... We are actively working on a number of extensions ... Soon ...



Available Soon

[Our] prototype ... included many moving pieces that only [student] knew how to operate ... **he left.**



Personnel Issues

[Our] prototype ... included many moving pieces that only [student] knew how to operate ... **he left.**



Personnel Issues

... the server in which my implementation was stored had a **disk crash** ... three disks crashed ... Sorry for that.



Lost Code

... the server in which my implementation was stored had a **disk crash** ... three disks crashed ... Sorry for that.



Lost Code

The code ... is ... **hardly usable**
by anyone other than the
authors ... due to our decision
to use [obscure variant of
obscure language]



Design Issues



7th Law of Artifact Sharing ***(Prepare to Share)***

Unless a project starts with the express goal of post-publication artifact sharing, getting the right code, in a timely fashion, out of the project is virtually impossible.

We will not provide the software
... [because we spent] **more time**
getting outsiders up to speed
than on our own research.



Academic Tradeoffs

We will not provide the software
... [because we spent] **more time
getting outsiders up to speed
than on our own research.**




Academic Tradeoffs

... **we can't share what did for this paper.** ... this is not in the academic tradition, but this is a hazard in an industrial lab.



Industrial Lab Tradeoffs

We have no plans to make the scheduler's source code publicly available ... because [ancient OS] as such **does not exist anymore.**



Obsolete SW/HW

We have an agreement with the [business], and we cannot release the code because of the potential **privacy risks** ...



Privacy/Security



Fear

Available
Soon...

Versioning

Personnel

Obsolete
SW/HW

Academic
Pressure

Licensing

Don't want

Fear

Poor
Design

Industrial
Lab Issues

Privacy/
Security



Sharing Proposal

— #1 —

Artifact Curation

Sharing Proposal

— #1 —

Artifact Curation



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
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
Create a password

SIGN UP FOR RUNMYCODE

Share

This service is based on the innovative concept of a companion website associated with a scientific publication.



Users Researchers Journals




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Title/Authors	Research Artifacts (?)	Details
<i>Optimal inference of fields in row-polymorphic records</i> Axel Simon		Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Author has not verified information More...
<i>VeriCon: towards verifying controller programs in software-defined networks</i> Thomas Ball, Nikolaj Bjørner, Aaron Gember, Shachar Itzhaky, Aleksandr Karbyshev, Mooly Sagiv, Michael Schapira, Asaf Valadarsky	<ul style="list-style-type: none">http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~shachar	Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Authors have not verified informat... More...
<i>Tracelet-based code search in executables</i> Yaniv David, Eran Yahav	<ul style="list-style-type: none">https://github.com/Yanivmd/TRACY	Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Authors have not verified informat... More...
<i>Modular control-flow integrity</i> Ben Niu, Gang Tan		Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Authors have not verified informat... More...
<i>Doppio: breaking the browser language barrier</i> John Vilk, Emery D. Berger	<ul style="list-style-type: none">http://www.doppiojvm.org/ 	Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Authors have not verified informat... More...
<i>Laws of concurrent programming</i> Tony Hoare		Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Author has not verified information More...
<i>Test-driven repair of data races in structured parallel programs</i> Rishi Surendran, Raghavan Raman, Swarat Chaudhuri, John M. Mellor-Crummey, Vivek Sarkar	<ul style="list-style-type: none">http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=25943... 	Discussion Comments: 0 Verification: Authors have not verified informat... More...

1. Help the public find artifacts
2. Motivate researchers to share






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
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


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
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
- **237 conferences**
- **20,000 articles**
- **39,000 unique authors**
- **67,000 verification emails sent**

Details
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
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ACM Programming Language Design and Implementation, PLDI 2014

- **237 conferences**
- **20,000 articles**
- **39,000 unique authors**
- **67,000 verification emails sent**
- **10% of articles are verified**
- **6% of articles have shared artifacts**

Details
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to share



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o share

***6th Law of Artifact Sharing
(Inverse Costner's Law)***

Even if you built it,
they still wouldn't come.



***6th Law of Artifact Sharing
(Inverse Costner's Law)***

Even if you built it,
they still wouldn't come.




Sharing Proposal

— #2 —

Checklists








GitHub tag
“pldi2019”

- Clearly link paper to artifact



- Clearly link paper to artifact
- Share everything



Includes:
libabc.so,...

- Clearly link paper to artifact
- Share everything
- Include external code



gcc 4.2!

- Clearly link paper to artifact
- Share everything
- Include external code
- Document software you can't include

4.7% of verified papers with shared artifacts have broken links



- Clearly link paper to artifact
- Share everything
- Include external code
- Document software you can't include
- Ensure availability

- 9% of emails bounced
- 14% of articles without any email address



- Clearly link paper to artifact
- Share everything
- Include external code
- Document software you can't include
- Ensure availability
- Use permanent email addresses

A rolled-up scroll with red rings and a piece of parchment with text. The scroll is positioned at the top of the image, and the parchment is unrolled below it. The background is a solid blue color.


5th Law of Artifact Sharing

To ensure repeatability of your results by others, you must

- 1.share everything
- 2.assume nothing
- 3.remain reachable

Sharing Proposal

— #3 —



Tool Support



VisTrails

Workflow v1.0

Data



www.vistrails.org

Paper



Abstract

We present a new general technique for protecting clients in distributed systems against *Remote Man-at-the-end* (R-MATE) attacks. Such attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to an untrusted client device and can obtain an advantage from tampering with the hardware itself or the software it contains.

In our system, the trusted server overpowers the untrusted client's analytical abilities by continuously and automatically generating and pushing to him diverse client code variants. The diversity subsystem employs a set of primitive code transformations that provide an ever-changing attack target for the adversary, making tampering difficult without this being detected by the server.

1. Introduction

Man-at-the-end (MATE) attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to a device and compromises it by tampering with its hardware or software. *Remote* man-at-the-end (R-MATE) attacks occur in distributed systems where *untrusted clients* are in frequent communication with *trusted servers* over a network, and malicious user can get an advantage by compromising an untrusted device.

To illustrate the ubiquity of R-MATE vulnerabilities, consider the following four scenarios. First, in the *Advanced Metering Infrastructure* (AMI) for controlling the electrical power grid, networked devices (*smart meters*) are installed at individual house-holds to allow two-way communication with control servers of the utility company. In an R-MATE attack against the AMI, a malicious consumer tampers with the meter to emulate an imminent blackout, or to trick a control server to send disconnect commands to other customers [2]. Second, massive multiplayer online games are susceptible to R-MATE attacks since a malicious player who tampers with the game client can get an advantage over other players [16]. Third, wireless sensors are often deployed in unsecured environments (such as theaters of war) where they are vulnerable to tampering attempts. A compromised sensor could be coerced into supplying the wrong observations to a base station, causing real-world damage. Finally, while electronic health records (EHR) are typically protected by encryption while stored in databases and in transit to doctors' offices, they are vulnerable to R-MATE attack if an individual doctor's client machine is compromised.


1.1 Overview

In each of the scenarios above the adversary's goal is to tamper with the client code and data under his control. The trusted server's goal is to *detect* any such integrity violations, after which countermeasures (such as severing connections, legal remedies, etc.) can be launched.

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
tryme

code diversity makes client tampering considerably more difficult without detection, since client tampering can only be detected at client-server interaction events. Furthermore, while our use of code diversity



VisTrails

Workflow v1.0



Data

Paper



Abstract

We present a new general technique for protecting clients in distributed systems against *Remote Man-at-the-end* (R-MATE) attacks. Such attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to an untrusted client device and can obtain an advantage from tampering with the hardware itself or the software it contains.

In our system, the trusted server overpowers the untrusted client's analytical abilities by continuously and automatically generating and pushing to him diverse client code variants. The diversity subsystem employs a set of primitive code transformations that provide an ever-changing attack target for the adversary, making tampering difficult without this being detected by the server.

1. Introduction

Man-at-the-end (MATE) attacks occur in settings where an adversary has physical access to a device and compromises it by tampering with its hardware or software. *Remote* man-at-the-end (R-MATE) attacks occur in distributed systems where *untrusted clients* are in frequent communication with *trusted servers* over a network, and malicious user can get an advantage by compromising an untrusted device.

To illustrate the ubiquity of R-MATE vulnerabilities, consider the following four scenarios. First, in the *Advanced Metering Infrastructure* (AMI) for controlling the electrical power grid, networked devices (*"smart meters"*) are installed at individual households to allow two-way communication with control servers of the utility company. In an R-MATE attack against the AMI, a malicious consumer tampers with the meter to emulate an imminent blackout, or to trick a control server to send disconnect commands to other customers [2]. Second, massive multiplayer online games are susceptible to R-MATE attacks since a malicious player who tampers with the game client can get an advantage over other players [6]. Third, wireless sensors are often deployed in unsecured environments (such as theaters of war) where they are vulnerable to tampering attempts. A compromised sensor could be coerced into supplying the wrong observations to a base station, causing real-world damage. Finally, while electronic health records (EHR) are typically protected by encryption while stored in databases and in transit to doctors' offices, they are vulnerable to R-MATE attack if an individual doctor's client machine is compromised.


1.1 Overview


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tryme

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
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tryme



VisTrails - Vistrail Builder

File View Help

Send to Spreadsheet

corie5.xml - Time Step 1 corie5.xml

```

    graph TD
      Reader[vtkElcircUnstructuredGridReader] --> Mapper[vtkDataSetMapper]
      Mapper --> Actor[vtkActor]
      Actor --> Renderer[vtkRenderer]
      Renderer --> Window[vtkRenderWindow]
      Actor --- Prop1[vtkProperty]
      Actor --- ActorProp[vtkTextProperty]
      Actor --- ActorProp2[vtkTextProperty]
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      Actor --- ActorProp100[vtkTextProperty]
  
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Visualization Name: Time Step 1 Change

Search:


VTK Classes Module Methods

Method	Signature
vtkElcircUnstructuredGridReader	
SetVerticalScale	void(double)
SetTimeStep	void(int)
SetFromLayer	void(int)
SetToLayer	void(int)
vtkDataReader	
vtkAlgorithm	
vtkObject	
vtkObjectBase	


Update Update and Send

SetFileName
const char * (unnamed) c:/data/corie/2_salt.63

SetTimeStep
int (unnamed) 1



control servers of the utility company. In an R-MATE attack against the AMI, a malicious consumer tamper with the meter to emulate an imminent blackout, or to trick a control server to send disconnect commands to other customers [15]. Second, massive multiplayer online games are susceptible to R-MATE attacks since a malicious player who tampers with the game client can get an advantage over other players [16]. Third, wireless sensors are often deployed in unsecured environments (such as theaters of war) where they are vulnerable to tampering attempts. A compromised sensor could be coerced into supplying the wrong observations to a base station, causing real-world damage. Finally, while electronic health records (EHR) are typically protected by encryption while stored in databases and in transit to doctors' offices, they are vulnerable to R-MATE attack if an individual doctor's client machine is compromised.



4th Law of Artifact Sharing

When a
Computer
Scientist is first
made aware of the
Reproducibility Problem,
their first thought is



4th Law of Artifact Sharing


When a
Computer
Scientist is first
made aware of the
Reproducibility Problem,
their first thought is

Oh, I can build a
tool for that!



Sharing Proposal

— #4 —




Rewarding Good Behavior

Sharing Proposal

— #4 —

Rewarding Good Behavior





ARTIFACT



PLDI 2017 PLDI Research Artifi x

https://pdi17.sigplan.org/track/pdi-2017-artifact

Write a Blog >>

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Sign in Sign up

PLDI 2017

PLDI 2017 PLDI Research Artifacts

Call for Research Artifacts


PLDI 2017 is continuing the novel experiment that began at PLDI 2014 and which has been employed for PLDI 2015 and 2016: **giving authors the opportunity to submit for evaluation any artifacts that accompany their papers.** Similar experiments ran successfully for OOPSLA, POPL, ESEC/FSE and ECOOP.

Background

A paper consists of a constellation of artifacts that extend beyond the document itself: software, proofs, models, test suites, benchmarks, and so on. In some cases, the quality of these artifacts is as important as that of the document itself, yet most of our conferences offer no formal means to

Important Dates
Mon 10 Apr 2017 Research artifact acceptance notification
Wed 1 Mar 2017 Basic artifact functionality evaluation deadline
Mon 20 Feb 2017 Research artifact submission deadline





Paper accepted?

ARTIFACT

PLDI 2017 PLDI Research Artifacts

Call for Research Artifacts


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



ARTIFACT

Artifact
accepted?




OK!





Paper accepted?




ARTIFACT


Artifact accepted?



OK!



- Voluntary
- Does not affect accept/reject
- No expectation of sharing




Paper accepted?

ARTIFACT

Artifact accepted?



OK!



Accepted Artifacts / Accepted Papers (%)


Accepted Artifacts / Accepted Papers (%)




Accepted Artifacts / Accepted Papers (%)




Accepted Artifacts / Accepted Papers (%)




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
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
Accepted Artifacts / Accepted Papers (%)



Conferences with AE



Publication Venues (Dblp)



Sharing Proposal

— #5 —

Punishing Bad Behavior



Title



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Copyright

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Sharing Contract

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Author

I'm committing to this level of sharing

Title



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Copyright

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Sharing Contract

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Accept/
Reject?



Reviewer

I'm committing
to this level of
sharing



Author

Title



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Copyright

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Sharing Contract

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You promised!



Reader

I'm committing to this level of sharing



Author

Title



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Copyright

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Sharing Contract

.....

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Sharing Contract

- License: ...
- Artifacts: source code, data, ...
- Where: ...
- Support: ...



Sharing Proposal

— #7 —



Sharing Proposal

— #7 —



CS Research Methods Courses?



CS Research Methods Courses?



- Reading, writing, presenting, reviewing papers
- Experimental design
- Statistics, data processing, visualization
- Proposal writing, career issues
- Intellectual property, research ethics

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- Reading, writing, presenting, reviewing papers
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Reproducibility???

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
DEPARTMENT OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

2.671 Measurement and Instrumentation



Keeping a complete and accurate record of experimental methods and data ... **could someone else**, ... use your notebook to **repeat your work**, and obtain the same results?

Reproducibility PI Manifesto



Lorena Barba

I pledge to

- teach grad students about reproducibility
- share artifacts at the time of submission
- add a *reproducibility statement* to papers

Sharing Proposal

— #8 —



All I Really Need
to Know I Learned in

Kindergarten



**Why do we care about
reproducibility and repeatability?**



**Why do we care about
reproducibility and repeatability?**



**Why do we care about
reproducibility and repeatability?**



**Why do we care about
reproducibility and repeatability?**

Dear B, I read your nice paper, thanks for sharing the code! However, I'm unable to reproduce your results.

Sincerely,

A



Dear A, thank you for pointing
out our errors!

Best wishes,
B



Dear A, thank you for pointing
out our errors!

Best wishes,
B

Respect

A

Yes, Computer Scientists Are Hypercritical

By Jeannette M. Wing

October 6, 2011

[Comments \(15\)](#)

VIEW AS:



SHARE:



Are computer scientists hypercritical? Are we more critical than scientists and engineers in other disciplines? Bertrand Meyer's August 22, 2011 [The Nastiness Problem in Computer Science](#) blog post partially makes the argument referring to secondhand information from the National Science Foundation (NSF). Here are some NSF numbers to back the claim that we are hypercritical.

This graph plots average reviewer ratings of all proposals submitted from 2005 to 2010 to NSF overall (red line), just Computer & Information Science & Engineering (CISE) (green line), and NSF minus CISE (blue line). Proposal ratings are based on a scale of 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). For instance, in 2010, the average reviewer rating across all CISE programs is 2.96; all NSF directorates including CISE, 3.24; all NSF directorates excluding

CISE, 3.30.

BLOG@CACM



Yes, Computer Scientists Are Hypercritical

By Jeannette M. Win

October 6, 2011

[Comments \(15\)](#)

VIEW AS:



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CISE, 3.30.

DBMS Research First 50 Years, Next 50 Years

Jeffrey F. Naughton



- SIGMOD 2010
- 350 submissions
- Number of papers with all reviews “accept” or higher:

1

BLOG@CACM

The Nastiness Problem in Computer Science

By Bertrand Meyer

August 22, 2011

[Comments \(33\)](#)

VIEW AS:			SHARE:							
----------	---	--	--------	---	---	---	---	---	---	---



Are we malevolent grumps? Nothing personal, but as a community computer scientists sometimes seem to succumb to negativism. They admit it themselves. A common complaint in the profession is that instead of taking a cue from our colleagues in more cogently organized fields such as physics, who band together for funds, promotion, and recognition, we are incurably fractious. In committees, for example, we damage everyone's chances by badmouthing colleagues with approaches other than ours. At least this is a widely perceived view ("*Circling the wagons and shooting inward*," as Greg Andrews put it in a recent discussion). Is it accurate?

One statistic that I have heard cited is that in 1-to-5 evaluations of projects submitted to the U.S. National Science Foundation the

BLOG@CACM

The Nastiness Problem in Computer Science

By Bertrand Meyer


August 22, 2011

[Comments \(33\)](#)

VIEW

Are we malevolent grumps?



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
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<https://cacm.acm.org/blogs/blog-cacm/123611-the-nastiness-problem-in-computer-science/fulltext>

What Happened Next?





Submitted Paper




Conference	Authors	Title	Category	Link	Status	Builds	Database	Build
TODS'37	Davide Martinenghi, Marco Tagliasacchi	Proximity measures for rank join	Practical	Link from google	Not sent	-	Builds	Database Entry Build notes
TODS'37	Daniel Lemire, Owen Kaser, Eduardo Gutarra	Reordering rows for better compression: Beyond the lexicographic order	Practical	Link from paper	Not sent	-	Builds	Database Entry Build notes
TODS'37	Benny Kimelfeld, Jan Vondrak, Ryan Williams	Maximizing Conjunctive Views in Deletion Propagation	Theoretical	-	-	-	-	Database Entry -
TODS'37	Yinan Li, Jignesh M Patel, Allison Terrell	WHAM: A High-Throughput Sequence Alignment Method	Practical	Link from google	Not sent	-	Build fails	Database Entry Build notes
TODS'37	Yufei Tao, Cheng Sheng, Jianzhong Li	Exact and approximate algorithms for the most connected vertex problem	Practical	-	Email sent	Replied yes	Builds	Database Entry Build notes
TODS'37	Junhu Wang, Jeffrey Xu Yu	Revisiting answering tree pattern queries using views	Practical	-	Email sent	Replied no	-	Database Entry -
	Wenjie Zhang, Xuemin Lin, Ying				Email	Replied		Database Build

Hate Us on Facebook!




Hate Us on Facebook!

Your site is violating IRB guidelines – take it down!




Hate Us on Facebook!

**Your study
stinks! Why didn't
you just...**



Hate Us on Facebook!

**Your students
made rookie
mistakes!**



Hate Us on Facebook!

My code builds!




Hate Us on Facebook!

**Fine it
doesn't build, but
why didn't you
email me???**



Turnabout is Fair Play!



<http://cs.brown.edu/~sk/Memos/Examining-Reproducibility/>

Please let us know if there's anything we can do in support of your efforts to examine our paper! We think your effort is terrific!



Repeatability in Computer Science

[Home](#)::Table of Results — March 2014

Notice

Please disregard the results below — they are included for completeness but contain numerous errors. We have redone the study and [report the new results](#).

We originally put up this website so that the reviewers of our submitted paper could have access to our raw data, code, and technical report, in case they wished to review it. It was never publicly announced. Nevertheless, the site became public knowledge, and over the last week we have received many emails pointing out many apparent errors in the data. Some of these errors are, no doubt, a consequence of the definition of reproducibility we used in the study:

Can a CS student build the software within 30 minutes, including finding and installing any dependent software and libraries, and without bothering the authors?

As a result, we made another pass over the data, along with the people behind this [site](#). We very much welcome these *reviews-of-the-reviews* - this is exactly the way science should work! Please don't hesitate to contact us should you have any further questions and comments.

This page is set to be unindexed by search engines.

Christian and Todd

contributed articles

To encourage repeatable research, we made a second Open Records Act (ORA) request, this time for the email messages among the authors, hoping to trace the whereabouts of the source code. The legal department first responded with: "... the records will not be produced pursuant to [ORA sub-clause]." When we pointed out reasons why this clause does not apply, the university relented but demanded \$2,263.66 " ... to search for, retrieve, redact and produce such records." We declined the offer.

BY CHRISTIAN COLLBERG AND TODD J. ROBERTSON

Repeatability in Computer Systems Research

IN 2012, WHEN reading a paper from a computer security conference, we saw there is a clever way to defeat the system in the paper, and, in order to share this with the authors (faculty and graduate students) at a top-ranked U.S. computer science department, we asked for access to their prototype system. We received no response. We thus decided to implement the algorithms in the paper but soon ran into several obstacles, including a variable utility function defined but never used, and a formula that did not typecheck. We asked the authors for clarification and received a single response: "I unfortunately have few recollections of the work ..."

We next made a formal request to the university for the source code under the broad Open Records Act (ORA) of the authors' home state. The university's

A group of independent researchers set out to verify our build results through a crowd-sourced effort; <http://cs.brown.edu/~sk/Memos/Examining-Reproducibility>

backed up, we made a second ORA request, this time for the email messages among the authors, hoping to trace the whereabouts of the source code. The legal department first responded with: "... the records will not be produced pursuant to [ORA sub-clause]." When we pointed out reasons why this clause does not apply, the university relented but demanded \$2,263.66 " ... to search for, retrieve, redact and produce such records." We declined the offer.

We instead made a Freedom of Information Act request to the National Science Foundation for the funded grant proposals that supported the research. In one, the principal investigator wrote, "We will also make our data and software available to the research community when appropriate." In the

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Saumya Debray, Shriram Krishnamurthi, Alex Warren, and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable input.

many challenges, so funding agencies should provide support for the engineering resources necessary to enable repeatable research.

- To incentivize authors to share their research artifacts, publishers should require pre-publication declarations from authors specifying their commitment to sharing code and data.

ILLUSTRATION BY ANTHONY FREDA

are included for completeness but the study and [report the new results](#).

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g and the authors?

along with the people behind this [site](#). We very is exactly the way science should work! Please further questions and comments.

Christian and Todd

contributed articles

To encourage repeatable research, we made a commitment to sharing research artifacts.

BY CHRISTIAN COLLBERG AND TODD PROEBSTING

Repeatability in Computer Systems Research

A group of independent researchers set out to verify our build results through a crowd-sourced effort; <http://cs.brown.edu/~sk/Memos/Examining-Reproducibility>

backed up, we made a second ORA request, this time for the email messages among the authors, hoping to trace the whereabouts of the source code. The legal department first responded with: "... the records will not be produced pursuant to [ORA sub-clause]." When we pointed out reasons why this clause does not apply, the university relented but demanded \$2,263.66 " ... to search for, retrieve, redact and produce such records." We declined the offer.

IN 2012, when we published our paper on computer systems research, there is a common theme in the paper: the authors of the top-ranked U.S. journals have no responsibility for access to their research artifacts. Algorithmic obstacles, function of formulae, and for clarification, unfortunately.

We next made a formal request to the university for the source code under the broad Open Records Act (ORA) of the authors' home state. The university's

research artifacts, publishers should require pre-publication declarations from authors specifying their commitment to sharing code and data.

Repeatability and Benefaction in Computer Systems Research

A Study and a Modest Proposal

University of Arizona TR 14-04

Christian Collberg collberg@gmail.com

Todd Proebsting proebsting@cs.arizona.edu

Alex M Warren amwarren@email.arizona.edu

Christian and Todd



ShriramKrishnamurthi

@ShriramKMurthi

Follow



They did ***crap*** work, would not admit to when caught out and even pretended it hadn't happened.



<https://twitter.com/ShriramKMurthi/status/863462366226370561>



...these researchers have done a disservice to science by publishing a study they knew to be **horse manure**, and then piling more **bull crap** on it when caught ... they are simply trying to build a reputation off a problem they don't really care to solve ...



*To the University of Arizona
Institutional Review Board:*

Revoke their IRB permission!



FindResearch.org

1. Their deception study was bad
– I don't trust them!



FindResearch.org

1. Their deception study was bad
 - I don't trust them!
2. They're violating my privacy!



FindResearch.org

The authors

- *have*
 - *have not*
- verified*

1. Their deception study was bad
– I don't trust them!
2. They're violating my privacy!
3. They're spying on my computer!



FindResearch.org

The authors

- *have*
 - *have not*
- verified*

A rolled-up scroll with red rings and a piece of parchment with text. The scroll is positioned at the top of the image, and the parchment is unrolled below it, showing the text.

3rd Law of Artifact Sharing (Mother's Law)

Without a culture of respectful academic interchange, where failure is seen as an accepted part of the progression of science, sharing will not become default behavior.

Risks



Rewards

Risks



Rewards

Credibility: They may trust your work more when they can try it.

Risks



Rewards

Credibility: They may find bugs and not trust your results.

Credibility: They may trust your work more when they can try it.

Risks



Rewards

Credibility: They may find bugs and not trust your results.

Credibility: They may trust your work more when they can try it.

Visibility: They may notice your work when they can build on it.

Risks



Rewards

Credibility: They may find bugs and not trust your results.

ROI: They may ignore your code in spite of your efforts to share.

Credibility: They may trust your work more when they can try it.

Visibility: They may notice your work when they can build on it.

A rolled-up scroll with red rings and a piece of parchment with text. The scroll is positioned at the top of the image, and the parchment is unrolled below it, showing the text.


2nd Law of Artifact Sharing (ROI)

The root of the scientific transparency problem is sociological, not technological: we do not share solid artifacts because there is little professional glory to be gained from doing so.

Recommendations for VISSOFT

Recommendations for VISSOFT

1. Agree on a checklist

- 
- Share everything
 - Document software you can't include
 - Clearly link paper to artifact
 - Include external code
 - Ensure availability
 - Use permanent email addresses

Recommendations for VISSOFT

1. Agree on a checklist
2. Describe experiments

Recommendations for VISSOFT

1. Agree on a checklist
2. Describe experiments
3. Require sharing statement

CSET'18 CFP

... include in the paper an artifact sharing statement describing whether some or all of the artifacts will be made available to the community ... This statement should be present during both submission and in the final version of the paper. ... while sharing may be taken into account by reviewers, it is not a requirement for acceptance.

Recommendations for VISSOFT


1. Agree on a checklist
2. Describe experiments
3. Require sharing statement
4. Ensure consistency between paper and artifact:

Camera-Ready: July 31, 2019

Artifact Submission: July 8, 2019

1st Law of Artifact Sharing
(Corollary to Max Planck's Quip)

Scientific transparency advances
one funeral at a time.



Thank you!

