CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All Browsers

Article Details
Title:	CRLite: A Scalable System for Pushing All TLS Revocations to All Browsers
Article URLs:	https://doi.org/10.1109/SP.2017.17 http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/SP.2017.17
Alternative Article URLs:
Authors:	James Larisch	Northeastern University
	David R. Choffnes	Northeastern University
	Dave Levin	University of Maryland
	Bruce M. Maggs	Duke University Akamai Technologies
	Alan Mislove	Northeastern University
	Christo Wilson	Northeastern University
Sharing:	Unknown
Verification:	Authors have not verified information
Artifact Evaluation Badge:	none
Artifact URLs:	https://www.securepki.org
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NSF Award Numbers:	1409249, 1421444, 1563320, 1564143
DBLP Key:	conf/sp/LarischCLMMW17
Author Comments:

IEEE Security and Privacy, S&P 2017