Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing

Article Details
Title:	Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
Article URLs:	https://doi.org/10.1109/FOCS.2015.92 http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/FOCS.2015.92
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Authors:	Saeed Alaei	Google Research, Mountain View, CA
	Jason D. Hartline	Northwestern University
	Rad Niazadeh	Cornell University
	Emmanouil Pountourakis	Northwestern University
	Yang Yuan	Cornell University
Sharing:	Unknown
Verification:	Authors have not verified information
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NSF Award Numbers:	0910940, 0830773
DBLP Key:	conf/focs/AlaeiHNPY15
Author Comments:

IEEE Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS 2015